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I. INTRODUCTION
Cigarette smoking is the number one cause of preventable death
in the United States.' It kills more people annually than cocaine, alco-
hol, heroin, fire, suicide, homicide, AIDS, and auto accidents com-
bined.2 The negative health effects of second-hand smoke, also known
as environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), are also well documented.3
Eighty-two percent of adult smokers began smoking before they were
eighteen.'
Yet despite its enormous toll on the public health and the large
number of underage smokers, tobacco products continue to enjoy
relative immunity from regulation. This immunity seems to stem
from the tobacco industry's vast financial resources, aggressive oppo-
sition to all forms of regulation, and unparalleled intrusion into the
* Staff Attorney, Tobacco Control Resources Center, Boston, MA. B.A. 1994, Columbia
University; J.D. 1998, Northeastern University School of Law. Special thanks to Patricia David-
son for her numerous insightful reviews of this piece. This Article is based on work supported
by the National Institutes of Health/National Cancer Institute Grant Award No. 1ROl
CA67805, titled Legal Interventions to Reduce Tobacco Use. Any opinions, findings, and conclu-
sions or recommendations expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the prime sponsor.
1. An estimated 419,000 deaths (approximately 20% of all deaths in the United States) were
attributable to smoking in 1990. Centers for Disease Control, Cigarette-Smoking Attributable
Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
645, 645-49 (1993).
2. Id.
3. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has categorized environmental tobacco
smoke as a Known Human Carcinogen. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPI-
RATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS
1-3 (1992); see, e.g., A.K. Hackshaw, Lung Cancer and Passive Smoking, 7 STAT. METHODS.
MED. RES. 119 (June 1998); K. Steenland et al., Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and
Risk Factors for Heart Disease in the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 147
AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 932 (May 1998).
4. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Trends in Smoking Initiation Among
Adolescents and Young Adults, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 521 (1995).
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political process.' Because of the tobacco industry's influence over
federal and state legislators, it is extremely difficult to pass effective
tobacco control regulation at federal and state levels.6 Only recently,
with the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the attorneys
general of forty-six states and the major tobacco manufacturers, has
the industry faced any substantial tobacco control measures.
While it is a commonly-held perception that the war against
tobacco ended after this historic settlement agreement, this is not the
case. Tobacco regulation continues on at the state and local levels.
Furthermore, because the MSA did not adequately address several key
issues and completely neglected others, such as youth access and pro-
tection of nonsmokers from ETS, there is plenty of room for state and
local governments to step in and address this vexing health problem.
This Article examines Washington's exemplary tobacco control
efforts in the context of the larger, historical struggle to regulate
tobacco. The Article begins in Part II with a brief description of the
history of tobacco regulation in the United States. Part III examines
the Master Settlement Agreement and its weaknesses. Part IV dis-
cusses the preference for local government regulation and the obstacles
encountered. Part V examines the scope of legal authority of Wash-
ington's local governments to enact tobacco control measures, and
Part VI describes Washington's tobacco control measures and the
interplay between local, state, and federal laws.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOBACCO REGULATION
Tobacco has a long and colorful history in the United States.
Tobacco was used by the original Native Americans, was quickly
adopted and spread by European explorers, and subsequently became
a staple crop of the southern colonies.8 Tobacco was used in various
forms, including snuff, pipes, cigars, cigarettes, and chewing tobacco.9
In the earlier part of this century as much as fifty percent of the U.S.
5. Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63-98 (1997).
6. Id. at 63.
7. See Master Settlement Agreement (viewed November 29, 1999), <http://www.naag.
org/cigmsa.rtf>. Minnesota, Mississippi, Florida and Texas, alleging similar complaints,
reached individual settlements with the tobacco industry before the MSA was adopted. State
Tobacco Information Center Settlement Library (viewed November 29, 1999) <http://stic.neu.
edu/settlement/index.html>.
8. For an informative account of the history of tobacco in the United States, see RICHARD
KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILLIP MORRIS (1996).
9. Id. at 14.
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population used tobacco products. ° Cigarettes became the most com-
mon form of tobacco because of their low cost, convenience, and quick
nicotine high.' Early attempts to discourage tobacco use, based on
moral grounds and anecdotal scientific evidence, were unsuccessful.
2
Not until the 1940s and 50s did the rising incidence of lung cancer
cause researchers to seriously question the health risks of tobacco
use.
13
In 1953, as a result of new research indicating the health hazards
of tobacco use, the major tobacco executives met to formulate a strat-
egy to address the potentially damaging consequences to the tobacco
industry.14 Consequently, in 1954, the tobacco industry paid for full-
page advertisements entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smok-
ers." These advertisements appeared in hundreds of U.S. newspapers
and promised to safeguard the health of smokers, and announced the
creation of the Tobacco Research Institute Committee (TIRC) to
promote disinterested research into the health consequences of smok-
ing. 15
Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had taken some
early steps to regulate cigarette advertising, 16 it was not until 1964,
with the publication of the first Surgeon General's Report on Smoking
and Health, that the tide began to turn against the tobacco industry.
The Surgeon General's Report announced a clear causal link between
tobacco smoking and some forms of cancer.' In response, Congress
passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA), 9 although tobacco lobbyists had some influence over the
final legislation.2" The FCLAA requires the now familiar warning on
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Id. at 66.
13. Id. at 2-36, 141-48.
14. See Humphrey ex rel. Minnesota v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. Cl-94-8565 (D. Minn.
filed Aug. 17, 1994), reprinted in 9.2 Tobacco Prod. Litig. Rep. (TPLR) 3.273 (1994); Chiles ex
rel. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466AO (Palm Beach County Cir. Ct. filed Feb.
21, 1995), reprinted in 10.1 TPLR 3.1 (1995).
15. Id. Later renamed the Center for Tobacco Research (CTR), the scientific neutrality of
this organization has always been dubious.
16. The FTC, for example, prohibited tobacco advertisements that made health claims.
See In re Phillip Morris & Co., 51 F.T.C. 857 (1955).
17. See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH:
THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
18. Id. at 175-235.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
20. For an instructive account of the politics behind the FCLAA, see KLUGER, supra note
8, at 278-91.
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the side of every cigarette package.21 However, in a perverse way, the
FCLAA has protected the tobacco industry by preempting lawsuits
based on inadequate warnings22 and preempting additional restrictions
on advertising or promotion that are "based on smoking and health.
23
Since the 1950s individuals have filed private lawsuits against the
tobacco industry for health-related claims.24 The industry has always
been able to defeat them by financially overwhelming its opponents
and using a freedom-of-choice argument that has resonated with
* 21jurors. In the 1990s new legal strategies evolved to level the playing
field, including class-action suits and third-party medical reimburse-
ment claims. 26 Perhaps the most damaging new weapon the plaintiffs'
lawyers had was the availability of new internal tobacco company
documents that came to light through previous litigation and tobacco-
industry whistleblowers. 27 These documents revealed that the tobacco
companies had been aware of the detrimental health effects of smoking
since at least 1953, had suppressed the results of internal research, and
had deliberately attempted to create doubt and controversy about the
health effects of smoking in the minds of the American public.2" In
addition, in contrast to congressional testimony by tobacco executives
in 1994, the internal documents showed the companies were well
aware of the addictive nature of nicotine and had deliberately engaged
29in manipulation of nicotine levels in their products.
As part of this new wave of lawsuits, in 1994, Michael Moore,
Attorney General for Mississippi, filed suit against the industry seek-
ing to reclaim medical expenses his state had spent on tobacco-related
21. The contents of the FCLAA warning were amended in 1970 and again in 1985. Cur-
rently, the statute requires all packages, billboards, and other advertising to display one of four
different rotating warnings. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994).
22. See Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 (1992).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) provides that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."
24. Early lawsuits against the industry (1954-1973) were unsuccessful because the scien-
tific causation was not clear and product liability doctrine had not yet evolved. In the 1980s, a
second wave of lawsuits arrived, following closely on the heels of asbestos litigation and the
advancements made in the theory of product liability (1983-1992). See R.L. Rabin, A Socio-
legal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853-78 (1992).
25. Id.
26. Id. See, e.g., Broin v. Phillip Morris, 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1994) (class action represent-
ing nonsmoking flight attendants); Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-
1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. filed May 23, 1994) reprinted in 9.2 TPLR 3.35 (1994).
27. Rabin, supra note 24, at 877; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 72.
28. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 77-80. Many of these industry documents are
available at <http://tobacco.neu. edu/links/tlinks.htm> (visited Dec. 6, 1999).
29. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 77-80.
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illnesses.3" Mississippi was soon followed by forty-one other states.
Facing potentially bankrupting liability, the tobacco industry consid-
ered settlement. In June 1997 a "global settlement" was proposed that
included regulation of tobacco products by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and industry immunity from private lawsuits,
terms which required congressional approval. Congress considered
various versions of the settlement, 31 but, when the terms became unfa-
vorable, the tobacco industry withdrew its support and engaged in
heavy lobbying, killing the settlement proposal in 1998.32 After the
federal proposal was defeated, state attorneys general continued to
meet with tobacco industry representatives to discuss a less compre-
hensive settlement. In November 1998 the attorneys general and the
major tobacco manufacturers33 announced the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA), in which the tobacco industry agreed to pay $206
billion to the states as compensation for their Medicaid expenses and
agreed to other tobacco control measures.34
While the attorneys general suits were proceeding, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) decided it should regulate cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco as "nicotine delivery devices."35 In 1996 the FDA
promulgated advertising and youth access restrictions, which were
promptly challenged by the major tobacco manufacturers.36 The dis-
trict court upheld the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products,
but concluded it had no authority to regulate advertising. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled the FDA had exceeded its authority
because Congress never intended to give the FDA jurisdiction over
30. See Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct.
filed May 23, 1994) reprinted in 9.2 TPLR 3.35 (1994). As an example of the political power of
the tobacco industry, the Republican governor of Mississippi, Kirk Fordice, took the unusual
step of trying to force his own Attorney General to drop the suit by seeking a writ of prohibition
in the Mississippi Supreme Court. See Fordice v. Moore, No. 96-M-114 (Miss. filed Feb. 17,
1996) reprinted in 11.2 TPLR 3.188 (1996).
31. See S. Res. 1415, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) ("McCain Bill" endorsed by Senate
Commerce Committee).
32. See Jonathan D. Salant, Tobacco Company's Lobbying Costs Drop, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ON-LINE, Sept. 28, 1999 (Tobacco industry spent $37 million in lobbying and $40 million in
advertising in 1988 to defeat the federal settlement proposal. Lobbying costs have dropped 70%
in 1999 as the battleground has shifted to the courts.).
33. The original participating manufacturers to the suit are Phillip Morris, Inc., R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., Lorillard Tobacco Co., and Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp. Since the
agreement, other tobacco manufacturers have subsequently signed onto the deal. See MSA, sig-
natories (on file with author).
34. The MSA will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
35. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,628 (1996) (asserting FDA jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 321).
36. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801, et al.).
37. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D. 1997).
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tobacco products. 38 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the
case.39 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a 5-4 majority,
acknowledged the health threat posed by tobacco products, especially
to children and adolescents, but concluded, "it is plain that Congress
has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise here."4
Additionally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil law-
suit last year against the tobacco industry.4 The suit alleges a long-
standing conspiracy to defraud and mislead the American public
about the health effects of smoking, and seeks to recover the billions of
dollars the federal government spends each year on smoking-related
health care costs.
42
Although the FDA case is over, tobacco control proponents
carefully watch the DOJ suit and the numerous private lawsuits that
continue to be filed.43 These cases may very well result in new federal
tobacco laws. In the meantime, however, states and their political
subdivisions can take the initiative to legislate in the areas not ade-
quately covered by the MSA.
III. THE PROVISIONS OF THE MSA
While the Master Settlement Agreement is a positive step in the
regulation of tobacco, much more can be done, especially in the areas
of access to tobacco products by minors and environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS).4 4 Because the agreement was a scaled-down version of
the proposed 1997 federal settlement, built around the premise that it
would not need or get approval from Congress or the White House,
there are many trade-offs in the agreement.4"
38. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
39. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
40. 120 S. Ct. at 1315.
41. United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV-2496 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22, 1999).
42. Congressional legislation bars the federal government from obtaining any of the funds
the MSA awarded to the states for their Medicaid expenses. The DOJ suit instead seeks com-
pensation under the Medical Care Recovery Act and Medicare Second Payer Provisions and
under civil provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See
DOJ complaint (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://tobacco.neu.edu/>.
43. In Engle v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9408273 (Fla. Dade County, Cir. Ct. 1999),
currently in trial, during the first phase a jury has already found the tobacco industry liable. The
second phase of the trial, regarding damages, is yet to come and may result in an industry-bank-
rupting verdict.
44. Please note that the MSA is not law but is a contract between the individual states and
the major tobacco manufacturers put into effect through consent decrees. Enforcement is left to
the parties, primarily the various state attorneys general. See MSA § VII (on file with author).
45. Without federal approval, states could not offer the tobacco industry the immunity it
desired from the numerous current and future private lawsuits against it. In exchange, the states
had to make concessions, including the lack of assent to regulation by the Food and Drug
Administration. See MSA (on file with author).
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The Master Settlement Agreement is a substantially smaller
financial settlement than the proposed 1997 settlement and does not
contain stringent tobacco control regulations.46 The participating
tobacco manufacturers have agreed to pay about $8 billion per year to
the various states as compensation for medical expenses paid by the
states.47 They also assented to certain advertising restrictions and to
paying $250 million to create a national foundation that will fund
health studies and pay for antitobacco advertising. The tobacco
industry is not required to raise the price of its products, although this
is likely to occur to pay for the settlement.49
More specifically, the MSA bans all advertising using cartoons,
but not human figures; Joe Camel is dead, but the Marlboro Man
lives."5 Tobacco ads on billboards, buses, and subway cars are
banned, but outdoor ads smaller than fourteen square feet are permit-
ted.51 Tobacco advertising in sports arenas and venues is banned, but
tobacco companies are each allowed to sponsor one sporting event a
year for each brand they manufacture. 2 The tobacco companies
agreed not to target youth, but will print no additional and unequivo-
cal health warnings on their packages. 3
In the MSA, the participating manufacturers and the attorneys
general state they are "committed to reducing underage tobacco
use."54 To that end the MSA set unit minimums of twenty cigarettes
per pack55 and limited free gifts and samples.56 However, no provi-
sions regulate self-service displays, point-of-sale advertising, or vend-
ing machines. Additionally, the MSA has no "look-back" provisions,
which set industry targets and penalties for the failure to achieve
reductions in teen smoking.57 No provisions in the MSA deal with
environmental tobacco smoke.
46. For a detailed analysis of the MSA, see Tobacco Control Resource Center, The Multi-
state Master Settlement Agreement and the Future of State and Local Tobacco Control: An Analysis
of Selected Topics and Provisions of the Multistate Master Settlement Agreement of November 23,
1998, (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://tobacco.neu.edu/>.
47. See MSA § IX (on file with author). These funds are now available to the states.
48. See MSA § III & VI. The national foundation is now known as the American Legacy
Foundation.
49. C.L. Hays, RJR Nabisco Earnings Slid by 54% in the First Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1999, at C-4.
50. MSA at III(b), 11(1).
51. Id. at III(d), 11(ii).
52. See MSA at III(d), III(c)(2).
53. Id. at III(a).
54. Id. at I.
55. Id. at II(k). The unit minimum expires on December 31, 2001.
56. See MSA III (g), (h).
57. Look-back provisions were part of the McCain Bill, supra note 31.
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As a consequence, tobacco control proponents argue that the
MSA is largely toothless: tobacco companies can still advertise
broadly and target minors. Vendors are still allowed to have unlimited
outdoor signs up to fourteen square feet in size. The youth access
provisions are weak, there are no look-back provisions, and there are
no ETS provisions. The primary benefit of the MSA is that the price
of cigarettes will go up, which is likely to decrease consumption.
58
Additionally, the states may use the settlement funds for health and
antismoking programs, although the preliminary indications are that
many states will use the funds as a cash windfall. 9 Only six states,
Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, Vermont, New Jersey, and Washing-
ton, have pledged to fund tobacco control programs beyond a minimal
level at this time.6°
In light of the inadequacies of the MSA, states can, and should,
play an active role in further (or continuing) tobacco-control regula-
tion. As explained in the next section, such regulation and enforce-
ment are most effective when performed at the local level.
IV. THE LOGIC OF LOCAL ACTION AND ENFORCEMENT 6'
Legislation can occur at the federal, state, and local levels. When
it comes to tobacco regulation, the industry's tremendous financial
power and lobbying connections have enabled it to largely escape
regulation.62 Indeed, the higher up the political ladder, the easier it is
for the tobacco industry to exert influence on the decision-makers.
Accordingly, on the national and state level, the tobacco lobby has
been extremely successful in preventing damaging legislation. As
Raymond Pritchard, former chairman of the board of Brown and Wil-
liamson Tobacco Company confirmed,
Our record in defeating state smoking restrictions has been rea-
sonably good. Unfortunately our record with respect to local
measures ... has been somewhat less encouraging ... Over
time, we can lose the battle over smoking restrictions just as
decisively in bits and pieces-at the local level-as with state or
federal measures.
63
58. See Hays, supra note 49.
59. See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, The State Tobacco Settlement (visited Nov. 16,
1999) <http://www. tobaccofreekids.org/html/1998_tobaccosettlement.html>. The settle-
ment funds need to go through a budget and appropriations process in each state.
60. See id.
61. Title is borrowed with permission from Graham Kelder, The Logic of Local Action and
Enforcement, TOBACCO CONTROL UPDATE, Summer/Fall 1997.
62. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 67.
63. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY ET AL., ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS:
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Tobacco control regulations at the local level remain very effec-
tive, largely because local legislators are less susceptible to outside
influences and are more accountable to their constituents.64 Local
legislation also remains easier to pass and is usually much stronger
substantively than legislation passed at the state level. In addition,
local enforcement agencies provide a more efficient enforcement
mechanism, especially when compared to distant state or federal
enforcement agencies.6" Finally, local regulation serves an educational
function, potentially altering social norms about tobacco use.66
The tobacco industry opposes tobacco control regulations
through a variety of tactics, including using other business associations
as fronts to oppose legislation,67 using fake grass-roots (astroturf)
organizations to create a perception of public support, 6 and intimidat-
ing local governments with limited budgets by threatening to
challenge regulations in court. 69 However, the industry's primary tac-
tic is simply to lobby for state or federal legislation preempting the
laws of lower jurisdictions.7"
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
the laws of the federal government are "the supreme Law of the
Land;... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary Notwithstanding. '' 7 ' Federal preemption occurs when Con-
gress enacts a statute that explicitly preempts state law, state law actu-
ally conflicts with federal law, or federal law occupies a legislative field
to such an extent that there is no room for state regulation. 72  Simi-
larly, state and federal law can preempt local government legislation.
While laws passed by the federal government and the states can
benefit the public health by establishing uniform, minimum stand-
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S STEALTH STRATEGY IN STATE LEGISLATURES 1 (May 28, 1996).
64. See Michael Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control: Review of an Emerging Public
Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858, 859-60 (1997).
65. See PETER D. JACOBSON, JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS:
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 94 (1997).
66. Graham Kelder, The MSA's State and Local Lobbying Restrictions, TOBACCO CON-
TROL UPDATE, Winter/Spring 1999.
67. Commonly, restaurant associations are used to oppose ETS restrictions and conveni-
ence store associations to oppose youth access laws. See Edward L. Sweda, Jr. & Richard A.
Daynard, Tobacco Industry Tactics, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL. 183-92 (1996).
68. Ralph Perrella, Joe Camel in Sheep's Clothing: The Tobacco Industry Tries to Pass
"Astroturf-roots" Organizations Off as Grassroots Organizations, TOBACCO ON TRIAL, Aug./
Sept. 1994, at 14.
69. See Kelder, supra note 66. See, e.g., Myron Levin & Dan Morain, An Inside Look at
Battles of Big Tobacco Politics: Documents Detail the Industry's Decade Long Efforts to Influence
Outcome of State's Smoking Wars, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at Al-Metro.
70. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 14.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
72. See Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
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ards, or "floors," they can also be used to prevent more stringent local
regulations by creating "ceilings." 73 The tobacco industry often pro-
motes this preemptive legislation under the guise of pro-health initia-
tives that establish uniform restrictions." However, in reality, the
legislation prevents the passage of stricter local laws and is often weak
substantively, containing loopholes or weak enforcement mecha-
nisms.7"
Unfortunately, preemptive state laws were given an inadvertent
boost in 1992 with the passage of the Synar Amendment. This federal
law requires states to enact and enforce youth access to tobacco laws in
order to receive federal funding.76 While this has resulted in the pas-
sage of many new state tobacco laws, tobacco lobbyists have fre-
quently been able to have preemptive provisions inserted.77 As of
January 1999, thirty-one states have enacted tobacco laws with pre-
emption provisions." Of these new laws, twenty-one preempt various
youth access provisions, eighteen preempt various clean indoor air
provisions, and seventeen preempt restrictions on tobacco advertising
and promotion.79 However, since 1996 no preemptive state tobacco
control laws have been passed, possibly because of an increased com-
munity awareness of the potentially harmful effects of preemption and
a shift in tobacco industry priorities from state to federal restrictions
and ongoing litigation.80
Because the political structure of every state varies, the ability to
pass tobacco regulation at the local level requires a state-by-state
examination to determine the relationship between state and local
power and the authority of localities to create legislation. Washington
is an exemplary state for its tobacco control efforts. An examination
of the interplay between its state and local tobacco control laws is
illustrative.
73. Centers for Disease Control, Preemptive State Tobacco Control Laws-United States,
1982-1998, 47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1112-14 (1999) [hereinafter Preemptive
State Tobacco Control Laws].
74. See Timothy J. DeGeeter, The Politics of Reducing Tobacco Use Among Children and
Adolescents: Why The Food and Drug Administration Cannot Regulate Tobacco Use and Proposed
Policy for States and Local Communities, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 367, 394 (1995-1996).
75. See id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994).






V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON STATE
Within a state, tobacco control can occur on several different lev-
els. On the state level, the legislature can pass laws and administrative
agencies can promulgate regulations. On the local level, cities, towns,
and counties can often pass ordinances, and local administrative agen-
cies can promulgate regulations. However, on the local level, the
power of cities, towns, and counties to pass ordinances varies widely
from state to state. This section will examine Washington's legal
structure to determine the basis of local government authority to pass
and enforce tobacco control measures and limitations on that author-
ity. I will also examine boards of health, which are important local
government entities.81
A. Municipal Legal Authority
Washington courts have consistently held that a municipality's
power to act must be derived from the state constitution or from an
express grant of power by the legislature. 2 In City of Tacoma v. Tax-
payers of City of Tacoma, 3 the court declared: "[M]unicipal corpora-
tions possess only those powers conferred on them by the constitution,
statutes, and their charters. Authority must derive from either an
express grant or by necessary or fair implication from such a grant."4
Turning to the Washington constitution, 5 we find that Article
XI, Section 11 provides that "any county, city, town or township may
make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."6
Regarding this constitutional grant of power, Washington courts
have stated that the police power is as ample as that possessed by the
81. As used herein, the term municipality will be used interchangeably to designate a local
government body, which can include a county, city, town, township, or a combined city-county.
(Under the Washington constitution, any county may form a home rule charter for a combined
city-county municipal corporation. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 16).
82. See Michael Monroe Kellog Sebree, Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home
Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 WASH L. REV. 155, 160 (1989).
83. 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
84. Id. at 685-86 (citation omitted).
85. Washington became the third state in the Union to provide for municipal "home rule"
when its constitution was ratified in 1889. Under "home rule," municipalities have inherent
power to regulate affairs within their boundaries as long as they are not inconsistent with state
law. This is in direct contrast to Dillon's Rule, the rule followed by most states at the time, that
interprets municipalities as having only that power which is expressly delegated by the state, nec-
essarily implied, or essential to the exercise of those express powers. For an informative discus-
sion of the history of these two theories, see Sebree, supra note 82, at 156-59 (1989). Despite the
broad home rule language of the Washington constitution, Washington courts have construed
municipal power narrowly. See id. at 160.
86. WASH. CONST., art. XI, § 11.
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legislature itself. 87 Furthermore, it requires no sanction from the state
legislature as long as the subject matter is reasonable and consistent
with state laws."
The police power has been interpreted broadly by the United
States Supreme Court to include everything essential to the "public
safety, health, and morals." 9  Washington courts have endorsed a
similarly broad view of the police power, defining it as "that inherent
and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."9" Accordingly,
the police power is used to pass a wide variety of ordinances, from
banning the sale of fireworks, 91 to putting vicious dogs to sleep,92 to
prohibiting the use of motor boats on certain lakes."
While the police power is broad, it is not unlimited. Regulations
must be reasonable.94 In determining reasonableness, a court will con-
sider whether an ordinance serves a legitimate public purpose and
whether the requirements of the ordinance bear a reasonable relation-
ship to accomplishing the ordinance's purpose. While courts are
highly deferential to a municipality's judgment, they do strike down
regulations that are unreasonable under this test.96 For example, in
Lenci v. Seattle,97 a municipal ordinance required vehicle wrecking
yards to be enclosed by an eight-foot high wall or fence and prohibited
more than one entrance onto a public way.9 The court upheld the
fence requirement as being reasonably related to the purpose of
reducing crime, but invalidated the entrance requirement as unrea-
sonably interfering with a property owner's access to the roads.99
87. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 689, 958 P.2d 273, 279 (1998) (up-
holding county ban on jet skis and personal watercraft as within police power and not conflicting
with state law).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 678, 958 P.2d at 279 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894)).
90. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 692, 958 P.2d at 280 (citation omitted).
91. See Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wash. 2d 556, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).
92. See Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash. 2d 278, 957 P.2d 621 (1998).
93. See State of Washington v. Everett Dist. Justice Ct., 92 Wash. 2d 106, 594 P.2d 448
(1979).
94. See Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 700, 958 P.2d at 284.
95. See id.
96. See Homes Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 154, 579 P.2d 1331 (1978).
97. 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 675-79, P.2d at 934-36. See also Marantha Mining, Inc. v. Pierce County, 59
Wash. App. 795, 801 P.2d 985 (1990) (reversing denial of unclassified use permit to operate a
surface mine and asphalt pit based on "community displeasure" as beyond the police power);
State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash.
2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957) (holding that an action of the zoning committee was arbitrary and
capricious in the absence of finding of detriment to the health and safety of the community).
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B. Conflicts of Law and Preemption
A municipal ordinance is presumed to be constitutional, and a
heavy burden rests upon the challenger to establish unconstitutional-
ity.100 However, if an ordinance is found to conflict impermissibly
with state law or if the state legislature has decided to preempt the
field, an ordinance will be invalidated.' 0
Under Article XI, section 11 of the Washington constitution,
municipal regulations cannot conflict with the general laws of the
state. An unconstitutional conflict will be found where an ordinance
permits what is forbidden by state law or prohibits what state law
permits. 1°' Under this conflict test, if an ordinance is less rigorous
than state law and thereby permits what state law forbids, it will be
found unconstitutional.'03 However, if an ordinance is more restrictive
than state law, the laws are not seen as conflicting unless the state has
intended to preempt the area. 104 If there is room for concurrent juris-
diction, both the state and the municipality may exercise their pow-
ers. 10 5  Indeed, the courts often attempt to harmonize the laws
wherever possible.0 6 For example, in Brown v. City of Yakima,' °7 the
court upheld a city ordinance regulating the sale and use of fireworks,
which was more restrictive than state law. The court held that where
an ordinance and a state law are both prohibitory, and where the ordi-
nance is more restrictive than state law, "they are not deemed incon-
sistent because of a mere lack of uniformity in detail."'0 8
Preemption will be found where the courts determine a legisla-
tive intent to control the field, leaving no room for local regulation.0 9
Legislative intent may be express or implied."0  Express intent is
found in the wording of a statute and is fairly straightforward.
Implied intent requires the court to make a determination of legislative
intent based on the purpose of the statute or legislative history. For
example, in City of Seattle v. Williams,"' the court invalidated a city
100. See Rabon, 135 Wash. 2d at 287-89, 957 P.2d at 625 (upholding city ordinance gov-
erning dangerous dogs because not preempted by state law).
101. See id. at 287, 957 P.2d at 625.
102. See id. at 289, 957 P.2d at 627.
103. See id.
104. See Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wash. 2d 556, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).
105. See id. at 559, 807 P.2d at 354.
106. See id. at 560-61, 807 P.2d at 355.
107. Id. at 556, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).
108. Id. at 562, 807 P.2d 356.
109. See Rabon, 135 Wash. 2d at 289-91, 957 P.2d at 626.
110. See id.
111. 128 Wash. 2d 341, 908 P.2d 359 (1995). See also City of Spokane v. Portch, 92 Wash.
2d 342, 596 P.2d 1044 (1979) (invalidating local ordinance where state obscenity law was implied
to preempt the field).
2000] 1109
Seattle University Law Review
ordinance defining drunk driving in a stricter manner than state law.
The court found that the state legislature had intended to create a
uniform standard across the state when it set the blood alcohol level at
.10.112
C. Effective Municipal Power-Boards of Health
Boards of health are powerful local government bodies. They are
administrative agencies created by statute.113 Thus, they are granted
express powers from the legislature. State law, in section 70.05.060 of
the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), provides, in part:
Each local board of health shall have supervision over all matters
pertaining to the preservation of the life and health of the people
within its jurisdiction and shall: . .. enact such local rules and
regulations as are necessary in order to preserve, promote and
improve the public health and to provide for the enforcement
thereof;... provide for the prevention, control and abatement of
nuisances detrimental the public health .... (Emphasis added.)
In Spokane County Health District v. Brockett,114 the Supreme
Court of Washington upheld a needle exchange program that was
challenged by a state prosecutor as contravening state drug laws. The
court held that boards of health have the power to pass rules and
regulations concerning the public under the grant of the police power
under Article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. 115 The
court stated: "This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample
within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires
no legislative action for its exercise so long as the subject matter is
local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general
laws . 116
More importantly, though, the court affirmed the broad grant of
powers that the legislature has vested in boards of health under RCW
70.05.060.117 The court went on to say that, because boards of health
112. Williams, 128 Wash. 2d at 342-44, 908 P.2d at 360.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.05.035 (1998) (counties with a home rule charter); WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.05.035. (1998) (counties without a home rule charter).
114. 120 Wash. 2d 140, 839 P.2d 324 (1992).
115. Id. at 147-48, 839 P.2dat 328.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 149-50, 839 P.2d at 329. See also Snohomish County Builders Ass'n v. Snoho-
mish Health Dist., 81 Wash. App. 589, 508 P.2d 617 (1973) ("By the enactment of 70.05.060,
which delegates to local health boards the power to enact local health regulations, 'the legislature,
in the exercise of its police power, [has chosen] to provide the machinery whereby [local health
and sanitation] problems might be remedied on a local level.") (quoting Municipality of Metro.
Seattle v. Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 455, 357 P.2d 863, 869 (1960)); Kaul v. Chehalis, 45 Wash.
2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954) (upholding city authority to fluoridate water to prevent dental
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serve an important governmental function by preserving the health of
citizens, courts are to liberally construe public health statutes and the
actions of local health officials implementing those statutes. 118 In
addition, the court construed the use of the word "shall" in the state
statute as mandating officials to perform these duties." 9
In conclusion, a local government regulation, including a board
of health action, is likely to be upheld as long as: (1) the regulation
does not conflict (or is preempted) by state law, (2) the regulation is a
reasonable exercise of power, and (3) the subject matter of the regula-
tion is local. 12 Given this legal and structural framework, we can bet-
ter understand the interplay between state and local authority in
enacting tobacco control measures in Washington.
VI. WASHINGTON'S TOBACCO CONTROL MEASURES
The state of Washington has been on the forefront of tobacco
control. On the state level, the Department of Labor has passed
regulations prohibiting smoke in the work place. Further, the state
legislature has passed Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) restric-
tions and a comprehensive youth access law. However, the real suc-
cess story in Washington has been the local boards of health, which
have used their authority to aggressively regulate tobacco products. In
Washington, boards of health conduct retail compliance checks, pass
advertising restrictions, and sponsor educational programs to change
community attitudes and behavior toward tobacco use.
In addition, in contrast to other states, Governor Gary Locke has
indicated that he will use the settlement funds from the MSA for
health care, including an $100 million endowment which is to go
towards antitobacco initiatives.12' It is also worth noting that Attorney
General Christine Gregoire was the lead negotiator in the attorneys
general suits that resulted in the Master Settlement Agreement. 122
caries).
118. Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d at 149-50, 839 P.2d at 329.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 147-48, 839 P.2d at 328.
121. See Editorial, State's Tobacco Fight Earns Laurel Too Early, SEATTLE TIMEs (July 1,
1999) (despite pledge by governor, antitobacco funds must go through appropriations process
every year).
122. Washington State Gets $100 Million Bonus for Leading the Way in Tobacco Smoking
Deal, PORTLAND OREGONIAN (May 26, 1999). Attorney Gregoire has also served as the Chair
of the American Legacy Foundation, the nonprofit foundation created by the MSA to fund
health studies and pay for antitobacco advertising.
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A. Youth Access Measures
In every state, although selling tobacco products to individuals
under the age of eighteen is illegal, underage smokers easily obtain
tobacco products.2 In order to help deter youth smoking and limit
access to tobacco products, local governments can employ a variety of
measures. For example, depending on state law, local governments
can ban or restrict vending machines, point-of-purchase displays,
sampling, and single-cigarette packs.
In 1993 the Washington state legislature passed the comprehen-
sive Tobacco-Access to Minors Act, 124 incorporating many of the
youth access provisions mentioned above. The Act bans the sale of
tobacco through vending machines unless the machines are located in
adult-only establishments; prohibits the sale of single cigarettes
(defined as cigarettes not in their original unopened package); prohib-
its sampling in most public places; makes it a civil infraction for
minors to attempt to purchase tobacco products; and requires retailers
to check the age of purchasers.121 Unfortunately, following a pattern
in many states, the Act also preempts political subdivisions from
passing more stringent laws in these areas:
This chapter preempts political subdivisions from adopting or
enforcing requirements for the licensure and regulation of
tobacco product promotions and sales within retail stores ... No
political subdivision may: (1) impose fees or license require-
ments on retail businesses ... ; or (2) regulate or prohibit activi-
ties covered by RCW 70.155.020 through 70.155.080. This
chapter does not otherwise preempt political subdivisions from
adopting ordinances regulating the sale, purchase, use, or pro-
motion of tobacco products not inconsistent with chapter 507,
Laws of 1993.126
Although the statute contains an exception to the preemption
provision, it is not clear what remaining power local governments
have. Recent case law has upheld the authority of local governments
to restrict outdoor advertising restrictions127 and to criminalize youth
123. See J.R. Difranza et al., Youth Access to Tobacco: The Effects of Age, Gender, Vending
Machine Locks, and "It's the Law" Programs, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1271, 1271-73 (1996);
T.E. Radecki and C.D. Zdunich, Tobacco Sales to Minors in 97 U.S. and Canadian Communities,
2 TOBACCO CONTROL 300, 300-05 (1993).
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.155.130 (1998). Please note the deliberate wording of the
title: it is not "youth access to tobacco," but rather "tobacco access to youth."
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (W.D.
Wash. 1998), rev'd, 195 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
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possession of tobacco.12 However, an informal opinion of the Attor-
ney General indicates regulation of self-service displays in retail
establishments is likely to be preempted by the Act. 129 The opinion
explains that:
[t]he statute makes clear that the legislature intended to preserve
a realm of local jurisdiction over the sale, use, purchase, and
promotion of tobacco product. The first sentence of the statue,
however, also makes clear that, whatever this realm might be, it
does not include additional local regulation of the sale through
retail establishments. 1
30
Based on these cases and a literal reading of the statute, it appears
that local governments will be preempted from regulation of sale or
promotion within retail stores, but are free to regulate matters outside
retail stores, as long as they are not otherwise in conflict with the pro-
visions of the statute.
B. Licensing and Compliance Checks
While youth access laws are in place in many states, it is the
enforcement of those laws that determines their usefulness.' With-
out proper enforcement, retailers have little incentive to comply 32
Local governments can, however, use compliance checks and the
threat of suspension or revocation of retail licenses to effectively
enforce youth access laws. 1
33
In Washington, the Liquor Control Board has been granted the
authority to enforce the provisions of the Tobacco-Access to Minors
Act.'34 The Tobacco-Access to Minors Act specifically preempts local
government from adopting or enforcing requirements for the licensing
128. State v. Trudell, 1998 WL 213517 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding municipal ordi-
nance making it "unlawful for any person to sell, give, furnish or cause to be furnished to any
minor any cigarette, cigar or tobacco in any form, or for a minor to possess same" as falling with-
in express exception to preemption of RCW § 70.155.130). As a matter of public policy, the
efficacy of criminalizing youth possession is debated. Some believe criminalization takes the
focus off of retailers and potentially increases youth smoking by making it an attractive act of
rebellion. See Graham E. Kelder, The Perils, Promises and Pitfalls of Criminalizing Youth Posses-
sion of Tobacco, TOBACCO CONTROL UPDATE, Winter 1997.
129. Informal Opinion of the Attorney General Christine Gregoire to Dow Constantine,
State Representative (January 30, 1998) (on file with author) (responding to question asking if
RCW § 70.155.130 preempts a local government from regulating self-service displays of tobacco
products in retail establishments within its jurisdiction.
130. Id. at 5.
131. PETER D. JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS:
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 92-94 (1997).
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id. at 92-94.
134. WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.155.110 (1998).
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of tobacco products. 3 ' However, the statute allows the Liquor Con-
trol Board to work in conjunction with local health departments and
local law enforcement agencies to conduct random, unannounced
inspections to ensure retailers are following the law. 136  Currently, a
working relationship has evolved where many local governments con-
tinue to conduct compliance checks through their boards of health,
although they have no direct enforcement power.'37 The boards of
health notify the Liquor Control Board of violators that sell tobacco
products to minors as well as conducting follow-up visits. 38 Pursuant
to the statute, the Liquor Control Board sanctions violators with
graduated fines and the possibility of license suspension or revoca-
tion. 13' This has proved to be an effective working relationship. King
County, for example, operates the largest compliance check program
in the country and is nationally recognized for its high compliance
rates.4'
C. Advertising Restrictions
Several boards of health have enacted restrictions on outdoor
tobacco advertising, especially on impressionable minors."' The first
board of health to do so was the Tacoma-Pierce County Health
Department.'42 In 1996, after conducting hearings on the rising inci-
dence of youth smoking following the "Joe Camel" advertising
campaign, the department enacted the Truth in Outdoor Tobacco
Advertising Regulation (TOTAR). These regulations prohibited
all outdoor tobacco advertising in the county, including ads inside
stores that can be seen from the street. The regulations made an
exception for advertisements that contained only factual information
such as price and availability and that were printed in black and white
type (tombstone format). However, even tombstone advertisements
135. RCW § 70.155.130 provides that "no political subdivision may impose fees or license
requirements.., other than general business taxes or license fees not primarily levied on tobacco
products."
136. WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.155.110 (1998).
137. Telephone interview with Colin Jones, King County Health Department (Oct. 1999).
138. Id.
139. WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.155.100 (1998).
140. Illegal sales in King County have dropped from 60% in 1989 to a meager 5% in 1997.
Seattle & King County Public Health Dept., Tobacco Prevention Program (visited Dec. 6, 1999)
<http://www.metroke.gov/health/hlthlife/prevent.htm>.
141. Tacoma-Pierce County Board of Health Resolution No. 96-1997 (effective March 1,
1997).
142. Tacoma-Pierce, King, Snohomish, Spokane, and Southwest Washington Health Dis-
trict (representing Clark and Skamania) all enacted regulations restricting outdoor tobacco adver-




were prohibited from being placed within 1000 feet of schools, play-
grounds, and public parks.144
The TOTAR regulations were promptly challenged by five
small convenience stores, which complained that the rules restricted
their right to earn a living. Although a lower federal court upheld the
board of health regulations in Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health
Department, the appellate court for the Ninth Circuit recently over-
turned the decision.'45 The appeals court held that the regulations
were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (FCLAA), which prohibits regulation of tobacco advertising that
is "based on smoking and health." A closer examination of the vari-
ous issues presented in this case should prove informative.
The plaintiffs in Lindsey made four claims to the U.S. District
Court. They alleged that: (1) the TOTAR regulations violated First
Amendment protections for commercial speech, (2) the health
department exceeded its authority in enacting the regulations, (3) the
regulations were preempted by state law, and (4) the regulations were
preempted by federal law (FCLAA).'46
Plaintiffs claimed the advertising restrictions abridged their right
to free speech under the First Amendment. Acknowledging that the
First Amendment protects commercial speech as well as political
speech,'47 the district court proceeded to apply the four-part test set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Services Com-
mission. This test examines:.48
(1) whether the expression concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading;
(2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial;
(3) whether the regulation directly advances the government
interest asserted; and
(4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.
144. Id.
145. Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept., 195 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
146. Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept., 8. F. Supp. 2d 1213 (W.D. Wash
1997) (exceeding authority, state preemption, and federal preemption claims) and Lindsey, 8 F.
Supp. 2d 1225 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (first amendment claim).
147. Lindsey, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1227-28. See also Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) ("Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.").
148. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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The parties did not dispute the first and second prongs of the test
but concentrated on the more complex third and fourth prongs.'4 9
The plaintiffs argued that the regulations contained inconsistencies
that undermined their effectiveness, that advertising has little effect on
minors' decision to use tobacco products, and that the defendants
failed to explore less restrictive alternatives. 150  The defendant
responded that there was a logical nexus between the purpose of the
TOTAR regulations and the means chosen to carry it out, and that
they did not have to exhaust all other means of achieving their goals
before imposing the advertising restrictions.' Citing a similar case,
the court stated that "outdoor advertising is a unique and distinct
medium which subjects the public to involuntary and unavoidable
solicitation, and that children, simply by walking to school or playing
in the neighborhood, are exposed daily to this advertising."' 52 Fur-
thermore, the court found the regulations were not overly restrictive
because they allowed for advertising inside stores and in other loca-
tions where tobacco could be legally purchased.'
The plaintiffs also claimed the board of health acted outside its
authority when it enacted the TOTAR regulations.'54 The defendant
argued its actions were well within the authority granted it under
RCW 70.05.060, especially when construed liberally in accordance
with case law. 5 The district court easily found the board's actions
consistent with the police powers granted to local governments under
the Washington constitution and the broad statutory delegation of
power to health boards.5 6 It believed the regulations were reasonably
related to board of health authority and that an administrative appeals
procedure safeguarded against any arbitrary abuse of power.
15 7
On the state preemption issue, the plaintiffs argued that the
advertising restrictions were in conflict with the Tobacco-Access to
Youth Act and therefore void.'58 The defendants claimed that the
state law expressly allows for an area of local jurisdiction and that the
TOTAR regulations did not conflict with state law.' 59 The court con-
149. Lindsey, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
150. Id. at 1230-32.
151. Id.
152. Lindsey, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quoting Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305,
1314 (4th Cir. 1995)).
153. Id. at 1232.








cluded there was no conflict between the state law that prevents regu-
lation within retail stores and the TOTAR regulations that placed
restrictions on outdoor advertising)6 ° Additionally, the court inter-
preted the state statute as clearly envisioning concurrent jurisdic-
tion.16'
The plaintiffs also argued that TOTAR was preempted by fed-
eral law, specifically the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (FCLAA).162  FCLAA, in pertinent part, provides that: "[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under state law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter.' 1 63 The plaintiffs claimed the TOTAR
regulations are prohibitions based on smoking and health, which are
preempted. The defendant claimed that if the federal act is read nar-
rowly and fairly, the TOTAR regulations pass scrutiny because they
do not require the tobacco companies to take any affirmative action,
nor do they prohibit advertising or promotion. 64 In short, the regula-
tions restrict only the location of advertisements and do not affect the
content of the federally-mandated warning.'6S The district court
agreed with the board of health. 166  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed on this issue, without addressing the other claims.167 Finding
that the text and history of FCLAA did not support a distinction
between location restrictions and content restrictions, the appellate
court invalidated the TOTAR regulations.'68 The appellate court
believed that Congress intended to create a uniform tobacco advertis-
ing law and that this purpose would be impeded as much by various
160. Id. at 1224.
161. Id.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) (1994).
164. See Lindsey, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-20. See also Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 505
U.S. 504, 523 (1992) (concluding that the courts must construe the precise language of § 1334(b)
narrowly but fairly-in light of the strong presumption against preemption).
165. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).
166. Id. FCLAA, 15 U.S.C. § 1331, states:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a compre-
hensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to
any relationship between smoking and health, whereby (1) the public may be ade-
quately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of
warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes;
and (2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuni-
form, and confusing cigarette labeling advertising regulations with respect to any rela-
tionship between smoking and health.
167. Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept., 195 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
168. Id. at 8.
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location restrictions as by content restrictions. However, this Ninth
Circuit decision is in direct contrast with decisions by three other
appellate courts upholding similar outdoor advertising restrictions
enacted by the cities of Baltimore,'69 Chicago, 17' and New York.
171
The Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department has decided not
to seek further review of the Lindsey decision, citing financial rea-
sons.17 As a consequence, outdoor advertising restrictions enacted in
other Washington counties (and other locales within the jurisdiction of
the Ninth Circuit) face a greater risk of being challenged and defeated
in Lindsey's wake, although they remain in effect until litigated or
repealed by their respective local governing bodies.
D. ETS Restrictions
Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) can be a health hazard to
individuals who do not smoke, but who are exposed to tobacco smoke
by being in the same area as smokers. This is especially problematic
in confined areas where it is not feasible to simply move away from the
smoke, such as in the workplace or in certain public accommodations.
Government bodies can alleviate this hazard by enacting rules that
prevent smoking or restrict smokers to separate areas.
In 1994 the Washington Department of Labor and Industries, a
state-level administrative body responsible for workplace safety,
passed strict regulations pertaining to smoking in the workplace.'
Citing numerous studies showing a direct-link between ETS and heart
and lung disease, the Department restricted smoking in most enclosed
169. See Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63
F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1030 (1996), affd on remand, 101
F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding ordinance that prohibits the placement of any sign that
"advertises cigarettes in a publicly visible location" because FCLAA interpreted as not preempt-
ing location restrictions).
170. See Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189
F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding ordinance banning publicly visible advertisements of ciga-
rette and alcohol products because location restriction viewed as not interfering with FCLAA).
171. Compare Greater New York Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d
100 (2nd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1671 (2000) (upholding ordinance prohibiting tobac-
co advertisements within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds because location restriction will
not interfere with underlying purpose of FCLAA), with Rockwood v. City of Burlington, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 411 (D. Vt. 1998) (striking down ordinance on FCLAA preemption grounds as restric-
tion based on "smoking and health").
172. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department, Status of TOTAR in Pierce County,
News Release, December 3, 1999. The health department risked incurring liability for plaintiffs'
attorneys fees if it lost on further review. Id. It should be noted, however, that efforts were made
to have the Ninth Circuit rehear the case en banc. After the submission of additional briefs, on
March 13, 2000, the court declined a rehearing.
173. See Aviation West Corp. v. Washington State Dept. of Labor and Indus., 138 Wash.
2d 413, 415-16, 980 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1999).
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office places with exceptions for designated smoking rooms that are
vented to the outside. 174 Attorneys for the nation's six largest tobacco
companies and for three Washington businesses sought to overturn
the regulations, challenging the authority of the agency.175 The state
court, in a seven to two decision, held that the state was within its
rights to use the best available evidence to protect the health of its
workers.'76 The court noted the state's workplace safety laws are more
stringent than federal standards but stated,
[T]he Department of Labor and Industries has been vested with
significant authority to protect the health and safety of Wash-
ington's workers on the job site. We cannot say the Department
has abused that authority or acted irrationally here in regulating
smoke in the workplace in an effort to protect the health of
workers, both smokers and nonsmokers.
177
The Washington state legislature has also acknowledged the
dangers of ETS, and in 1985 it passed the Washington Clean Indoor
Act. 17  The Act prohibits smoking in all public places, including
buildings and transportation open to the public, but allows for the
designation of specific smoking areas within them.1 79  However, the
Act makes an express exception for a "bar, tavern, bowling alley,
tobacco shop, or restaurant, [which] may be designated as a smoking
area in its entirety."'8 °  Because these areas are expressly excluded
from the smoking ban, any attempt by local government to pass more
stringent regulations will likely be held preempted by state law.
Despite this obstacle, Washington boards of health have had
some success in getting restaurants to become smoke free. For exam-
ple, in King County, board of health members visit restaurant owners
and educate them about the hazards of ETS and the benefits of being
smoke-free.' This has proved successful, and nearly two-thirds of
the county's 2,525 restaurants now voluntarily ban smoking. 18 2 These
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 425, 980 P.2d at 707.
177. Id. at 440, 980 P.2d at 715.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.010-.900 (1998).
179. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.160.040 (1998) (Designation of smoking areas in public
places). A careful reading of the statute is necessary to determine which public places must
remain entirely smoke-free. They include elevators, public buses, government buildings and the
public areas of retail stores.
180. Id.
181. Telephone interview with Colin Jones, King County Health Department.
182. Aimee Green, Most King Eateries Now Ban Smoking: Growing Trend Attributed to
Pressure from Public, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE (Mar. 10, 1999).
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statistics denote a positive change in community norms regarding
tobacco use.183
VII. CONCLUSION
Fueled by solid evidence of the negative health consequences of
tobacco use and by knowledge of the industry's misconduct revealed
by industry whistleblowers and court documents, public perception of
the tobacco industry and its products is changing. This changing per-
ception has created a climate where juries can find tobacco companies
liable and where the attorneys general can force the industry to accept
regulation that would have been unheard of only a few years ago.
However, the political, legal, and financial might of the tobacco
industry has not disappeared, as evidenced by the failure of Congress
to pass national tobacco legislation in 1998. For that reason, continu-
ing efforts toward regulation are most easily conducted at the state
and, especially, the local levels.
In light of the inadequacies of the Master Settlement Agreement
in areas such as youth access and environmental tobacco smoke, there
is no better time for state and local governments to step in. The state
of Washington serves as a model in this regard, from its pledge to use
MSA settlement funds for health purposes, to its legal and educational
tobacco control initiatives, from its state legislature and state agencies
down to its municipalities and local boards of health. Washington
demonstrates that in our multilevel political system the government
can take steps to protect its citizens from the health hazard of tobacco
products against the might of powerful industries.
183. See generally Stanton A. Glantz et al., The Effects of Ordinances Requiring Smoke-Free
Restaurants and Bars on Revenues: A Follow-Up, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1687-93 (1997) (indi-
cating that smoke-free ordinances have not had an adverse economic effect on restaurants and
bars).
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